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Forthcoming in Silja Vöneky and Gerald L. Neuman (eds.), Human Rights, Democracy, and 
Legitimacy in a World in Disorder (Cambridge University Press, 2017)  
 
 





I. CONCEPTIONS OF EU CONSTITUTIONALISM  
 
The prevailing myth in European Union constitutionalism is that human rights were absent from 
the genesis of the EU legal order.1 Historical evidence marshaled to support this view includes 
the lack of a bill of rights from the original Treaties – Paris [1951] and Rome [1957] – as well as 
early decisions of the European Court of Justice denying recognition to such rights. While the 
need to protect human rights from violations by the European Community was occasionally 
invoked at the early stages of European integration, the Masters of the Treaties rejected that 
protection as ill-fitted to the project of a common internal market for whose completion they, 
participating nation states, were willing to transfer limited competencies to supranational 
                                                 
∗ Professor, Boston College Law School and Director, Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy, 
Boston College. I am grateful to Dimitry Kochenov, Daniela Caruso, Gráinne de Búrca, Gerald Neuman, Silja 
Vöneky, Adrienne Stone, Katharine Young and Paulo Barrozo for comments on this paper. I am also grateful for 
comments on earlier drafts to the participants in the conference “Human Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in a 
World in Disorder” at Harvard Law School (May 2016) and to the participants in a workshop at the Center for 
Comparative Law Studies, University of Melbourne (June 2017).  
1 My focus throughout this chapter is on the European Union (“EU”). By “European constitutionalism” I refer to 
constitutionalism in the EU, unless specific mention is made otherwise, for instance to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights.  
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political institutions. Only decades later, according to this account, did European Union 
institutions extend protection to human rights and only after municipal courts grew concerned 
that supranational legislation could potentially violate with impunity rights protected under 
national constitutions.2 Yet, even as new doctrines were being developed, the European Court of 
Justice was more interested in legitimizing European political institutions than, as one would 
expect in the case of human rights, in protecting the interests and/or needs of vulnerable rights 
holders.  
This purportedly descriptive account of human rights has far-reaching implications for 
European constitutionalism. If the account is accurate, how plausible does it make the claim that 
European norms have primacy over municipal norms, “however framed”3, especially in 
jurisdictions such as Germany and Italy that entrusted their judges with the enforcement of 
fundamental rights? Furthermore, how remedial could have been the process of filling in the 
gaps of the missing human rights doctrines as it exposed the European legal order as caving 
under national pressure? Adopting new human rights doctrines might have made European 
supremacy more palatable, but that was Pyrrhic victory if its effect was to subvert European 
law’s equally important claim to autonomy vis-à-vis municipal as well as international law.  
                                                 
2 The scope of human rights protection includes infringements by EU secondary legislation as well by national 
measures implementing EU legislation or falling within the scope of the EU. See Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt 
für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, 1989 E.C.R. 2609; Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE (ERT AE) 
v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis (DEP) (“ERT”), 1991 E.C.R. I-02925 (EEC).    
3 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594 (“It follows from all these observations that the law 
stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community 
law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question.”). This became a canonical 
statement, repeated ad litteram in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. I-125, 134, para. 3.  
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To salvage itself at least partially from this predicament, European constitutionalism 
recalibrated its claims. The prevailing myth offers one such account.4 Its starting point is the 
observation that, unlike municipal legal orders, which are comprehensive in scope, the legal 
system of the European Communities (now, Union) was largely tailored to the goal of the 
common market. Human rights were “of secondary importance at that (early) stage of European 
development” 5, their protection having been consigned to the national level and/or to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Since human rights protections were indispensable for 
any post-war legal order, the European Community law could meet this viability threshold only 
by drawing upon the normative resources of municipal legal orders. The separateness and 
autonomy of the municipal legal orders is thus secured: European constitutionalism cannot seek 
to displace municipal constitutional orders since it depends on them.6 This is a preservationist 
view, which sees European integration as at best a system of complex coordination between the 
supranational and national level of government, and among participating nation states 
themselves. Placed at the normative interface between supranational and national law, human 
                                                 
4 KLEMEN JAKLIC, CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EU 3 (Oxford 2013) (describing constitutional pluralism as 
“the dominant branch of European constitutional theory”). 
5 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of 
Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the European Legal Order of the European 
Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1106, 1113 (1986).  
6 European constitutionalism might, however, seek to transform national legal orders internally. Such transformation 
would be, for example, the effect of internalizing into the normative DNA of each municipal order the existence of 
other orders on equal footing, and hence a commitment to the preservation of the plurality of distinct political 
identities. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
BEYOND THE STATE 17 (Joseph H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003) (referring to the corollary of this principle 
of constitutional tolerance, understood as the “normative hallmark of European federalism.”).  
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rights have a uniquely important role. 7 They pierce the veil of European constitutionalism’s self-
serving claim that supremacy of EU law flows in one direction, from the top-down.8 The correct 
conception of supremacy is, in this view, bidirectional. The acceptance and implementation of 
EU supremacy by municipal legal orders is not only a precondition for its effectiveness but it is 
co-constitutive of the supremacy claim itself.9 Bidirectional supremacy is, therefore, the “deep 
structure” of human rights doctrines.10  
 Would that the European constitutional project fit this jurisprudential orthodoxy so 
neatly. But integration, it turns out, is a far more unruly Grundnorm of European 
constitutionalism than the conjectures of the preservationist model let show.11 The coordination-
of-separate-municipal-jurisdictions narrative offers at most a partial, and thus overall misleading, 
account of European constitutionalism. A fuller picture emerges as one places coordination 
                                                 
7 The same is true about human rights at the interface between the European and international legal orders. See 
Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-635. For an analysis, see Gráinne de Búrca, The 
European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2010). 
8 Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585. 
9 See, e.g., Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the European Legal Order, in THE EVOLUTION 
OF EU LAW 351 (Oxford, Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, eds., 1st ed., 1999) (“There is a second dimension to the 
[primacy] matter, which is decisive for determining whether the Court’s doctrines have an impact on legal reality: 
the attitude of national courts and other institutions.”).  
10 Weiler, supra note 5, at 1119. See also Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global 
Human Rights Actor, 105 Am. J. Int’l. L. 649, 668 (2011) (arguing that the recognition of human rights in the ECJ’s 
decisions did not come “out of blue” but was “preceded by heated political and legal debates in various European 
arenas about the implications of the doctrine of supremacy of EC law.”). Conversely, “the alleged concern for 
fundamental rights [was] … a disguise for the opposition to supranational power as such”, in Brun-Otto Bryde, The 
ECJ’s Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – a Milestone in Transnational Constitutionalism, in THE PAST AND 
FUTURE OF EU LAW 121 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loic Azoulai, eds., 2010) (citing in this context the work of 
Hans Peter Ipsen and other German scholars working in the first decades of European integration).  
11 See Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Compatibility of the draft agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, 2014 EUR-
Lex CELEX 613CV002 (Dec. 18, 2014), para. 172 (referring to integration as the “raison d’être of the EU itself.”).  
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games within a richer and more radical view of European integration. Since states provide 
neither the best solution to their coordination problems, nor the best institutional abode for their 
professed, and presumably shared, values, European integration is at its core a project of 
unification. From that distinct angle, European integration appears aimed at centralizing at the 
supranational level the core constitutive values and functions of nation states. The project 
challenges the autonomy and separateness of state formations. Coordination is a part of the 
process of integration, but it is emphatically not the normative horizon against which to 
understand that process. Supranational integration aims to fuse municipal jurisdictions, not to 
celebrate their autonomy.  
 The implications and complications of the project of European integration, understood in 
this radical iteration, reach as deep and far as its high ambitions to undermine “categories of 
thought which have been settled for centuries, overturn deep-rooted political ideologies and 
strike powerfully at organized interests.”12 Human rights are not late additions, but from the 
beginning part of a European legal order that is viable, if atypical in the modern age of nation-
states. They become visible on any search that uses at the supranational level methods of legal 
interpretation similar to those routinely deployed in domestic law. Furthermore, far from 
providing evidence of a deep normative dissonance between autonomy and supremacy, human 
rights reinforce the normative coherence of European constitutionalism.13 
                                                 
12 PIERRE PESCATORE, LAW OF INTEGRATION 26, 43 (1974).   
13 Manfred A. Dauses, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order, 10 E.L.REV. 398, 408 
(1985) (“the substance and limits to Community fundamental rights are determined in the final analysis not by the 
interactions with the national constitutions but by the structure of the autonomous Community legal order in the 
light its objectives of interaction.”).  
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 To be sure, this radical vision of European constitutionalism has lost much of its grip on 
contemporary constitutional thought. Its demise was not foreordained, but a comprehensive 
study of the deradicalization processes falls beyond the scope of this chapter.14 My interest here 
is more limited, namely the forensic study of the role of human rights in the clash of visions of 
European constitutionalism. I cannot, however, entirely suppress a more subversive aim. There is 
plenty evidence that the benumbing consensus around one, dominant vision of European 
constitutionalism has made it difficult to envision alternative accounts of human rights. 
Recovering some of the lost radicalism of European constitutionalism, by reclaiming some of 
those alternative accounts, could help to denaturalize the current uses, and to expose strategic 
misuses, of human rights.  
Exactly how to unravel the prevailing consensus around human rights is a question of 
choice. One string to pull could presumably be Kadi15 or the Opinions on the EU’s accession to 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Or one can start with Omega16, Åklagaren17 or any 
aspect of the still-underused Charter of Fundamental Rights. My own preference in this chapter 
is for the classic Solange saga. The reason is more than some chance interest in all things 
German or a general fondness for beginnings - “that god”, as Plato called it, “which as long as it 
dwells among men saves all things.”18 While Solange’s origins are German, its ghost has 
                                                 
14 I develop such an account in Vlad Perju, The Deradicalization of European Legal Integration (work in progress).  
15 Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. at I-635. 
16 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaustellungs GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609. 
17 Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Fransson, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX 610CJ0617 (Feb. 26, 2013). 
18 PLATO, LAWS VI 775.  
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travelled far beyond and become a building bloc of European constitutionalism.19 Part II presents 
Solange I as a clash of visions of European constitutionalism. Each of these visions is under-
theorized, but their significant overlap is sufficient to challenge the conventional interpretation of 
Solange I as a successful national rebellion against European supremacy on a human rights 
platform. Part III distinguishes between shallow and deep methodologies that guide the search 
for human rights, and shows how the former connects to the preservationist account of European 
nation states whereas the latter is an integral part of the bolder, unity-centered conception of 
supranational integration. Part IV presents the disconnect between, on the one hand, Solange I’s 
demise and, on the other hand, the resilience of its underlying account of human rights. The fact 
that subsequent doctrinal developments, which settled retroactively the meaning of Solange I, 
failed to bring closure to struggles over the nature of European supremacy and autonomy, 
supports the conclusion that human rights had been all along just the means to a larger end. The 
end, I submit, was to resist what Federico Mancini called “the Union moving toward 
statehood.”20 Resistance to that goal grew all the more urgent, the closer the goal came within 
reach. But once human rights as a medium of resistance had been compromised, more powerful 
tools, such as democracy, quickly took its place. Human rights were not altogether abandoned, of 
course, and Part V discusses subsequent repackaging strategies. Common to these strategies is a 
dovetailing of human rights and democracy, within the conveniently malleable framework of 
constitutional identity. Part VI is a brief conclusion. 
                                                 
19 The informed reader might find striking my omission from this analysis of the Italian reception, specifically the 
decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court. I believe an analysis of those cases, omitted here for reasons of space, 
would confirm the account I present in this paper. If anything, the Italian cases are less convoluted than the German 
one and certainly less influential. I discuss the Italian cases at great length in other work, see supra note 14.   
20 G. Federico Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4(1) EUR. L.J. 29, 31 (1998) (“[i]t seems to me that the 
closer the Union moves toward statehood, the greater the resistance to the attainment of this goal becomes.”).  
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER 
 
Solange 1 [1974]21 marks a critical juncture in the constitutional canon of European 
integration. Concerned about the implications of European constitutional doctrines on its 
mandate to enforce national constitutional protections of human rights, the German 
Constitutional Court held that, should conflicts arise between European secondary legislation and 
the human rights provisions of the German Basic Law, Karlsruhe retained “the right to review 
the validity of the Community legislation – that is, to render it without effect within the 
jurisdiction it controls.”22 What made conflicts possible, albeit, considering the European 
Community’s limited mandate, presumably unlikely, were missing guarantees at the European 
level equivalent to those afforded to human rights under the Basic Law. The holding that EU law 
lacks supremacy over German law so long as the European legal order fails to include human 
rights protections, an “inalienable essential feature”23 of municipal law, has systemic 
implications. It means that in the case of conflict with domestic human rights guarantees the 
legal effect of European legislation in one of the (originally, six) national jurisdictions depends 
on the existence or non-existence of adequate human rights guarantees at the supranational level. 
It is not the European doctrine of supremacy, as articulated by the European Court of Justice, that 
determines the effect of European legal norms in cases of their potential conflict with human 
                                                 
21 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271, 14 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 540 (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel (“Solange I”)).  
22 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X  
23 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 550.  
 9 
rights norms, but rather the independent assessment of municipal courts, making their decisions 
on the basis of a feature – human rights – they deem essential for national and supranational 
legal orders alike. Without the permission of municipal courts applying national human rights, 
European norms, including the doctrine of supremacy, lack legal effect; they gain no traction in 
reality.24 Put differently, whatever traction the supremacy claim might have domestically, it is 
not preconditioned by the European Court’s supremacy doctrine.25 Its real source is the 
acquiescence of the doctrine’s addressees in municipal law.26   
 This is a frontal attack on the Costa doctrine of the European Court of Justice, which 
claimed unqualified and automatic primacy for norms of primary and secondary European law 
over municipal legal norms, irrespective of their internal rank.27 But the exact scope of the attack 
requires interpretation. How far-reaching is it? Specifically, does the rejection of unqualified 
supremacy also entail a rejection of the autonomy of European law? And, if it does not, on what 
grounds does national acquiescence to European autonomy rest, once supremacy is rejected, 
given the European Court’s adamant efforts throughout its case-law to combine the doctrines of 
autonomy and supremacy in a unitary theory of European constitutionalism? 
On autonomy, Solange I’s dicta seems straightforward: “[i]n agreement with the law 
developed by the European Court of Justice”, the Court writes, “Community law is neither a 
component part of the national legal system nor international law, but forms an independent 
                                                 
24 See de Witte, supra note 9 (Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the European Legal Order). 
25 For an analysis of this argument, see Ulrich Scheuner, Fundamental Rights in European Community Law and in 
National Constitutional Law, 12 COMMON MKT. L.R. 171, 175-176 (1975).  
26 KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER 458, 459 (1996) (“the ECJ can say whatever it wants, 
the real question is why anyone should heed it.”).  
27 Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585.   
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system of law flowing from an autonomous legal source.”28 German judges acquiesce in the 
European Court’s Van Gend en Loos doctrine, that the Treaty of Rome is an independent source 
of law that brought into existence a legal order autonomous from both municipal and 
international law.29 The timing of this acceptance is also significant, since the contours of 
autonomy, and especially of how that doctrine sets European legal order apart from international 
law, had by the mid-1970’s become sufficiently discernible. Unlike in the case of international 
legal norms, autonomy implies that the implementation of norms of European law into domestic 
law escapes the control of each municipal jurisdiction. Whether they originate from the Treaty or 
from secondary legislation, decisions about the effect of European norms in domestic legal order 
are ultimately within the authority of the European Court of Justice. Pursuant to that authority, 
the European Court had held that, in specific though broadly construed situations30, European 
norms could directly confer rights to nationals that are justiciable in municipal courts.  
The gravitational pull of the doctrine of autonomy on the hierarchy of legal norms 
depends on the former’s jurisprudential underpinnings. For the Solange I Court, the background 
conception of the normative interface between European and national legal systems are the two 
legal systems “independent of and side by side one another in their validity.”31 Each apex court – 
Luxembourg and Karlsruhe – rules on the “binding force, construction and observance” of its 
own law. The courts of one system cannot rule on the validity or invalidity of the norms of the 
                                                 
28 Solange I, supra note 21. An earlier case where the German Constitutional Court emphasize the autonomy of the 
European legal order, see Lütticke, 31 BVerfGE 145 (1971).  
29 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
30 How broadly construed those cases were would become apparent over time. For one clear example, albeit one that 
post-dates Solange I, see Case C-43/75, Defrenne v Sabena (No. 2) 1976 EUR-Lex CELEX 675CJ0043 (Apr. 08, 
1976). 
31 Solange I, supra note 21, at X.  
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other system. In case of conflict, or at least of the kind of conflict that Solange I envisaged, 
national courts can dis-apply the European norm by depriving it of legal effect within the 
jurisdiction they control. Under this theory, the municipal and European legal orders are 
independent and co-exist alongside one another in their legal validity. 
Solange I was, of course, not the first time the coordination-centered vision had been 
articulated. The European Court itself had encountered a recognizable version from its own 
Advocate General, in Costa. 32 Its reaction on that occasion, and consistently in all the 
subsequent ones, was to reject it on the ground that it failed to conceptualize the European legal 
order as one different in kind from international law. “By contrast with ordinary international 
treaties,” the ECJ wrote, “the EEC treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry 
into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and 
which their courts are bound to apply.”33 For the European Court, supremacy is a normative 
implication of the autonomy of the European legal order.34 Once the difficult question of 
autonomy has been settled35, and settled specifically on the grounds laid out in Van Gend, the 
                                                 
32 The model adopted in Solange I was neither original nor confined to the municipal level. See AG Lagrange, 
Opinion, in Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 at 606 (arguing, unsuccessfully, that “the system of the 
Common Market is based upon the creation of a legal system separate from that of the Member States, but 
nevertheless intimately and even organically tied to it in such a way that the mutual and constant respect for the 
respective jurisdictions of the Community and national bodies is one of the fundamental conditions of the proper 
functioning of the system instituted by the Treaty and, consequently, the realization of the aims of the 
Community.”). For a similar interpretation of AG Lagrange’s position, see Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the 
Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1981).  
33 Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585. 
34 By normative implication I mean that the grounds on which autonomy rests extend to the hierarchy of municipal 
versus supranational norms. Normative implications are to be distinguished from logical implications.  
35 And apparently, it did so unanimously. See Editorial, For History's Sake: On Costa v. ENEL, André Donner and 
the Eternal Secret of the Court of Justice's Deliberations, 10(2) EUR. CON. L. REV. 191, 195, fn. 12 (2014) (relying 
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extension to supremacy of European over municipal norms is a small conceptual, albeit not 
political, step. Autonomy entails that national courts may not tie the effect of European norms to 
municipal rules, including rules of constitutional rank, that determine the domestic effect of 
international legal norms. Irrespective of whether national legal orders are monist or dualist, or 
any combination thereof, the imperatives of systemic unity demand the centralization of 
decisions regarding legal effect. This explains, for instance, the recurrent and tantalizingly 
tautological deployment of the effectiveness rationale in the formative decisions of European 
constitutionalism.36 Effectiveness speaks to a concern with the executive, as opposed to the 
purely normative, force of norms, a concern understandably heightened in legal orders at early 
stages of development. In the European supranational context, by contrast to international law, 
effectiveness is a function of the uniformity of interpretation and implementation, the idea that 
the legal effect of European legal norms cannot depend on the different traditions and structures 
of municipal jurisdictions, or even more questionably, on the political interests du jour.37 
                                                                                                                                                             
on circumstantial evidence to argue that the Costa holding was unanimous, by contrast to Van Gend, which was 
decided by the narrowest of margins (4 to 3 votes)).  
36 Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585 (“[T]he law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without 
being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called 
into question.”).  
37 The European Court argued that “[t]he obligations undertaken under the treaty establishing the Community would 
not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in question by subsequent legislative acts of the 
signatories.” Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585. But, as far as international law is concerned, the issue has its own 
complexities. The Permanent Court of International Justice had held that municipal norms, including norms of 
constitutional rank, could not be invoked to bar or otherwise limit that effect of international law, in Polish Postal 
Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 11 (May 16). Expanding on this analysis, Derrick 
Wyatt argued a few decades ago that pretty much everything the Court did in Van Gend could already be 
accomplished under international law. Derrick Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147, 148 (1982). 
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Centralization reflects the constitutional demands of a political project not guided by “the laws of 
expediency [but one that] should be built upon a more permanent and objective foundation.”38 
Echoes of this normative approach were not entirely absent from Solange I. In fact, they 
informed the forceful, unusual and now largely forgotten three-judge dissent. Judges Rupp, 
Hirsch and Wand rejected the majority’s view of coordinated, but always separate, legal orders 
standing side by side. Norms of European law, the dissenters argue, are “just as binding on the 
German authorities and courts as the norms of national law.”39 Following closely the European 
Court’s reasoning in Costa, the dissenters point out the unsustainable implications of the 
“inadmissible trespass”40 of allowing national legal orders to check the applicability of European 
norms. Empowering the courts of each of the member states to limit the effect of European 
norms, even on grounds as important as fundamental rights, would lead to “fragmentation of 
law”, thus “exposing a part of European legal unity, endangering the existence of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Bruno de Witte, Retour à “Costa”: La primaute du droit communautaire a la lumiere du droit 
international, 20 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 425 (1984). 
38 ANDRE M. DONNER, THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 59 (1968). This is not to deny that, 
conceptually speaking, coordination rationale can be sufficient to explain supranational centralization. In the case of 
European legal integration, such an account would envisage successive spill-over processes set and kept in motion 
by the need for ever more perfect coordination between municipal jurisdictions. But, as Donner suggests, that 
process would not rest on “permanent and objective foundation.” Even aside from close association between the 
logic of coordination and international law, one insuperable difficulty of understanding integration as an ever-
perfectible process of coordination is that, by itself such a process is aimless. What gives it direction is an 
understanding of its purpose, be that pacification, prosperity and/or the full axiological panoply of collective self-
government: equality, liberty, and solidarity. For a study, see Dimitry Kochenov, The Ought of Justice, IN DIMITRY 
KOCHENOV, GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, ANDREW WILLIAMS (EDS.), EUROPE’S JUSTICE DEFICIT (Hart Publishing, 2015); 
Pierre Pescatore, L’objectif de la Communaute Européene comme principes d’interpretation dans la jurisprudence 
de la Cour de Justice, in MISCELLANEA W.J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH 325-363 (Bruylant 2d ed. 1972). 
39 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 561. 
40 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 565. 
 14 
Community, and negating the very idea of European unity.”41 The dissenters go further and 
question the majority’s distinction between invalidity and inapplicability. The majority had held 
that depriving European norms of legal effect within Germany would not render those rules 
invalid. The dissenters are unconvinced, pointing out that “the distinction exhausts itself in the 
use of different words” and that, pace Kelsen42, a norm that, in the specific circumstances such 
as the ones at issue here, does not apply can be said to be invalid.43 To insist otherwise is to 
misunderstand the relevant context of a supranational legal order seeking to establish the 
connection between its norms and social reality. Indeed, the disapplication of a European norm 
within any part of territory of the European Community is a denial of legal effect whose proper 
interpretative context is the goal of European unity.44 The delineation of territory may track 
municipal jurisdictional boundaries, but the existence of such sub-European units is irrelevant 
from the integrated perspective of European law that conceptualizes the entire territory of the 
Community as one common jurisdiction. The effect of deferring to sub-European jurisdictions on 
                                                 
41 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 564. 
42 Kelsen had argued that “a single legal norm [does not] lose its validity if it is only exceptionally not effective in 
single cases”, in HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 212-213 (1967).  
43 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 564-565. Kelsen might have been right as a conceptual 
matter, but the matter presents itself here as contextualized for a (European) legal system that sees its legality of its 
norms threatened by non-application within a critically important part of its jurisdiction. Kelsen himself provides 
elsewhere some (admittedly rudimentary) tools to analyze this state of affairs, in this comments about the relation 
between the “ought of the legal norm” and the “is of physical reality”, in Kelsen, supra note 42, at 211-212. 
44 Insofar as disapplication seeks to erode validity, the same question can be asked of the “set-aside” order of the 
European Court of Justice in Simmenthal. See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze v Simmenthal SpA, 
1978 E.C.R. 629, 644, para. 22 (“Accordingly any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, 
administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the 
national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its 
application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent Community rules from having full force 
and effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of Community law.”). 
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the legal effect of European norms would be the fragmentation of European law, a blow to its 
effectiveness and legality.  
The account of the nature and implications of such a vision is bound to be ambiguous, so 
long as the vision remains under-theorized – a function both of its novelty, and, as far as the 
European Court is concerned, of the style of its judgments.45 Nevertheless, the comparison to 
international law is a source of insight. Writing extra-judicially, Pierre Pescatore, one of the 
European Court’s early towering figures, contrasted international law, which he saw as a law of 
“conflicts, equilibrium and coordination” and, when particularly successful, of “inter-state 
cooperation”, with the European legal order, which was “more than [international law]: a law of 
solidarity and integration.”46 Coordination of states is the logic of international law in a “society 
weakly organized and profoundly heterogeneous in the political, legislative and judicial 
needs.”47 By contrast, the aim of European Community law is “formation of a political will, the 
creation of a common body of legislation” – ultimately, “unification according to a coherent idea 
of order.”48 More recently, Gráinne de Búrca has traced the implications of this distinction for 
the early EC approaches to the European Convention on Human Rights, which was perceived as 
a typical instance of intergovernmental cooperation, and on that basis deemed inadequate.49 The 
                                                 
45 See generally Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2009). 
46 Pierre Pescatore, International Law and Community Law – A Comparative Analysis, 7 C. M. L. REV. 167, 169 
(1970).   
47 Id. at 170.  
48 Pierre Pescatore, L’application directe des traités européenes par les juridictiones nationales: la jurisprudence 
nationale, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 700 (1969). 
49 Gráinne de Búrca, supra note 10, at 666 (arguing that, by contrast to “[t]he Council of Europe [which] was 
established as a broader, pan-European organization for international cooperation on a range of issues that included 
human rights and cultural, educations, health and economic matters”, “the European Communities were a vehicle for 
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question remains about the basis of unification. Different forces or visions will drive the idea of 
“unifying Europe in a federation or remaining an order of nation states.”50 Sometime, that choice 
itself has been framed as one “between life or death, or freedom and slavery.”51 Less 
climactically, the option for unification as the modus of European integration has practical 
implications. For instance, as far as institutional identity is concerned, that choice grounds the 
dual identity – for courts, for citizens and businesses, and for national executive and legislatures 
– that has always been central to understanding European integration.52 At the interpretative 
level, the vision of unification underpins the choice for the normative basis for a teleological 
method in the early decisions of the European Court of Justice – as well as the deep ambivalence 
about the role that comparative law ought to play in the Court’s methodology.53  
 
III. HOW TO (NOT) FIND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER  
 
The implications of finding, or not finding, human rights in the European legal order are 
far-reaching. Those high stakes might understandably affect how the search is conducted. 
Specifically, the choice of a method may not be easily detachable from broader, background 
                                                                                                                                                             
states to pursue closer and deeper integration through a system in which they conceded some of their sovereign 
powers and accepted a significant degree of supranational control and influence by the new organization.”).  
50 Id.  
51 Jieskje Hollander, The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present). On Teachings and Life, 
17 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 197, 201 (2011). 
52 For a general study of split identity, see Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” 
(dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 209-231 (1990).  
53 For an observation regarding the paucity of comparative references, see Mattias Kumm, Internationale 
Handlesgesellschaft, Nold and the New Human Rights Paradigm, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW 108 
(Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loic Azoulai, eds., 2010).   
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conceptions of European constitutionalism. But, then, isn’t the outcome of the search for human 
rights preordained by the structure of the search itself (including mine in this chapter)?  
Consider first the methodology deployed in the majority opinion in Solange I. The 
German judges searched for a bill of rights in the text of the Treaty of Rome and for human 
rights interpretative rules in the opinions of the European Court of Justice. This shallow search 
was quick and it returned no results. It would have been “absurd”54 to claim a bill of rights in the 
Treaty of Rome or in the Treaty of Paris. The reason was not that human rights had not entered 
the drafters’ imagination.55 After all, human rights provisions had been included in the drafts for 
the European Defense Community and the European Political Community.56 But the political 
failure of those projects implied that, as one scholar described it, “the original euphoria gave way 
to sober utilitarian considerations and sight of a general concept of fundamental and human 
rights was lost.”57 By the time the Rome Treaty was drafted, including such provisions could 
have been misinterpreted as acknowledgment that European institutions might enact legislation 
                                                 
54 FEDERICO MANCINI, Safeguarding Human Rights: The Role of the European Court of Justice, IN DEMOCRACY 
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: COLLECTED ESSAYS BY JUDGE G. F. MANCINI 82 (2000) (“to 
say that the EC Treaty contains a Bill of Rights is … absurd.”).   
55 For a comprehensive study, see Gráinne de Búrca, supra note 10. Professor De Búrca finds that “the point in 
terms of political support for the creation of a powerful, supranational human rights regime was actually reached in 
the early 1950s an that progress in recent decades has been much more hesitant, equivocal, and deeply contested.”, 
at 651).   
56 Even the case for the European Economic Community’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
was advocated from the early stages of the process of integration. See, e.g., WALTER HALLSTEIN, EUROPE IN THE 
MAKING 49 (1973). 
57 Manfred A. Dauses, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order, 10 EUR. L. REV. 398, 
399 (1985).  
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capable of violating human rights, thus reaching far beyond the economic competencies that 
nation-states delegated to the supranational level.58  
As for the case-law of the European Court, the shallow search interprets the Court’s early 
decisions, from the oft-cited Stork59 to Sgarlata60 and beyond, as a self-evident rejection of any 
place for human rights in the European legal order. The inclusion of human rights came only 
later, when the European Court started to develop, including by incorporation from municipal 
law, human rights doctrines under pressure from national, especially German, judges. While such 
pressure pre-dated Solange I61, that decision crystallized and gave impetus to the counter-
reactions to European constitutionalism. The German judges deemed insufficient the European 
Court’s early openings towards fundamental rights; only a “catalogue of fundamental rights 
decided on by a parliament and of settled validity” could guarantee protections that are “reliably 
and unambiguously fixed for the future in the same way as the substance of the Constitution.”62 
Was it a coincidence that the call for a catalogue of fundamental rights, presumably in the mold 
of Germany’s Basic Law, as well as the decision to predicate it on the existence of “a 
democratically legitimated parliament directly elected by general suffrage which possesses 
legislative powers and to which the Community organs empowered to legislate are fully 
responsible on a political level”63, were made at a time when political stalemate within the 
                                                 
58 Weiler, supra note 5, at X (Eurocracy and Distrust)  
59 Case 1/58, Friedrich Stork & Cie v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1959 E.C.R. 17. 
60 Case 40/64, Sgarlata v Commission, 1965 E.C.R. 215. 
61 In a decision from 1967, the German Constitutional Court indicated it might have the right to review European 
legal norms. See 22 BVerfGE 293, 298. This decision sparked a robust academic debate. For a discussion, see Brun-
Otto Bryde, supra note 10, at 120-21.   
62 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X. 
63 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X. 
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Community institutions made it impossible to enact even minor legislation, much less the kind of 
Treaty-level overhaul that the German judges called for?  
Contrast the above approach with a deep search for human rights. Starting from the 
premise that, as a constitutional matter, the European legal order was as viable as municipal legal 
orders, it follows that interpretative methods at the supranational level should be aligned with 
methods used in municipal law.64 While legal interpretation differs across legal traditions, 
interpreters often reject reject fetishism of specific bill of rights provisions in favor of more 
comprehensive, systemic and structural human rights protections.65 Rights-granting provisions in 
the Treaty of Rome become visible on such a recalibrated constitutional radar.  Some of these 
provisions fall under the equality rubric – the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
nationality66 and gender in the case of equal remuneration67 – while others are part of a more 
general right to freedom. The four fundamental freedoms (goods, capital, services and workers) 
had originally an economic cast, which would become less dominant as the doctrines developed 
over time.68 One level deeper than separate clauses, one finds general principles of law. Some of 
these principles are mentioned explicitly in the Treaty, whereas others are implied and surface 
                                                 
64 Dauses, supra note 57, at 408 (The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order) (“the 
substance and limits to Community fundamental rights are determined in the final analysis not by the interactions 
with the national constitutions but by the structure of the autonomous Community legal order in the light its 
objectives of interaction.”).  
65 So long as the European Court has the means to protect, and it has protected, fundamental rights, it is irrelevant if 
rights are protected through codification. Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 653 (dissenting 
opinion). 
66 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 26, 1957, art. 7(1). 
67 Treaty of Rome, supra note 66, art. 119, at 62.  
68 MANCINI, supra note 54, at 82 (SAFEGUARDING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE) 
(“[I]s it not a fact that the major legal discovery of the twentieth century is the danger which the economy represents 
to human rights?”). 
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through judicial interpretation. The legality of administration69, the principles of legal 
certainty70, fair hearing71, and good faith72, as well as the prohibition of double jeopardy73, fall in 
this latter category. Another level deeper, the search turns to the institutional structure of 
Community legality, directly relevant to gauge the role of human rights within the scope of 
European constitutionalism. Legality requires that the European Court’s role, under the Treaty, 
be to ensure that “in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed.”74 The 
Court fulfills its task through ex ante and ex post jurisdictional tools similar to those of any 
municipal independent court. The rule of law, in the Court’s interpretation and application, is 
part of the “very structure of the Communities.”75  
How does a deep search for human rights integrate the early cases of the European Court, 
explicitly denying recognition to human rights? A first step is to read those decisions in their 
proper historical context. Those cases involved the impact of the High Authority’s regulations or 
decisions reorganizing the sale of coal in the Ruhr within the newly created European Coal and 
Steel Community. Coal wholesalers that could no longer maintain their status after the High 
Authority modified the qualification thresholds or other application rules moved in direct actions 
to annul Community legislation that allegedly violated their property rights. But since no explicit 
provision of the Treaty of Paris protected that particular right, petitioners had recourse to 
                                                 
69 Case 9/56, Meroni, 1958 E.C.R. 133.  
70 Joined Cases 17 & 21/61, Klöckner and Hösch, 1967 E.C.R. 325. 
71 Case 32/62, Alvis 1963 E.C.R. 49. 
72 See. e.g., Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. I-649. 
73 Joined Cases 18 & 35/65, Gutmann Cases, 1966 E.J.R. 61.  
74 Treaty of Rome, art. 164. 
75 Pierre Pescatore, Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the System of the European Communities, 18 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 343, 347 (1970). 
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national law in order to claim their right. Many cases arose in the German context, and so the 
German Basic Law became the constitutional framework of reference. From the European 
Court’s perspective, the substantive aspects raised by petitioners were entirely dependent on the 
structural issues involving the two legal orders: municipal and European. And it was on 
structural grounds that the European Court decided those cases. Without fail, it refused to strike 
down the Community legislation on the ground that European norms violated national 
(constitutional) law. The European judges held that the application of national law fell outside 
their purview. One finds here, in an incipient form, jurisprudential questions that would 
eventually find their unmistakable answer in the supremacy doctrine. But, and this point is 
critical, the legal analysis of the early cases reflects the terms of the Coal and Steel 
Community76, in which the legal debates were inevitably nailed to the cross of the specific – and 
narrow – contexts in which they arose.  
By contrast, when human rights eventually received recognition in the European legal 
order, that recognition came in cases that were preliminary references brought under the Treaty 
of Rome and, importantly, after the European Court formulated its radical doctrines of autonomy 
and supremacy.77 Consider Stauder, a preliminary reference, where the petitioner challenged a 
Community scheme to dispense subsidized butter as a violation of his right to dignity, in that 
access to that benefit was conditioned on his proving his identity by showing a special identity 
card that included his full name. The case turned on discrepancies between the German 
                                                 
76 And, in one instance, of the European Atomic Energy Community. See Joined Cases 18 & 35/65, Guttman v. 
Comm’n, EUR-Lex CELEX-61965J0018 (May 5, 1966). 
77 Scholars commonly acknowledge the implications of the doctrine of supremacy for human rights. See supra note 
10. As I argue in this chapter, it is in my view important to see the doctrine of autonomy as shaping in equal measure 
the human rights debate.  
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translation of the Community norm that applied to the petitioner, and the version of the 
legislation in other Community languages. The Court sensibly removed the conflict by holding 
that the versions of the legislation that imposed less stringent identity requirements were to be 
given legal effect. The European Court did not make the point that human dignity is a German 
provision without equivalent in the Treaty systems. It simply noted that the interpretation it 
favored contained “nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the 
general principles of Community law and protected by the Court.”78  Even that brief dicta was 
unnecessary, judging by the holding of the case, but it makes perfect sense for the Court in the 
post-van Gend/Costa era to signal its  readiness to take seriously the responsibilities it had 
assumed once it articulated the double helix of European constitutionalism: autonomy and 
supremacy.  
Less than a year later, the European Court provided as detailed an account of “the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal system” as its style and form of 
judgment allowed.79 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 80, the case that would eventually 
become Solange I before the German Constitutional Court, the European judges held that “the 
respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by 
the Court of Justice.”81 Restating its steadfast doctrine that assessing the validity of Community 
law by national standards would undermine “uniformity and efficacy of Community law” 82, the 
Court concluded that the legal effects of Community norms cannot be affected by the claims that 
                                                 
78 Case 29/69, Stauder v Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419.  
79 See Perju, supra note 45 (Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice). 
80 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
1970 E.C.R. I-125.  
81 Id. at para. 4. 
82 Id. at para. 3. 
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they violate fundamental rights in the national constitution or to the principles of a national 
constitutional structure. The national constitutional traditions are sources of inspiration for 
Community law, but the rights themselves fit within the presumably self-referential “framework 
of the structure and objectives of the Community.” Drawing inspiration from national law does 
not undercut the core axes of European constitutionalism because the process of recognizing 
human rights remains solely within the authority of the European Court. From Luxembourg’s 
standpoint, the recognition of human rights does not dilute or otherwise qualify the doctrines of 
European constitutionalism:  “the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, 
cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however framed, 
without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question.”83 The Court then proceeded to find the regulatory 
scheme challenged in IH as not violating the principle of proportionality, a legal principle of 
European law.84  
Finally, there is Nold, which begins the indispensable task of operationalizing human 
rights doctrines. The facts in Nold recalled the early cases under the Paris Treaty about changes 
in the regulation of coal sales that allegedly violated plaintiff wholesalers’ fundamental rights to 
                                                 
83 Id.  
84 The recognition of the existence, and indeed centrality, of proportionality in the European legal order as early as 
IH falsifies, in my view, attempts to justify Solange I as rooted in the misgivings of the German judges that their 
much-cherished proportionality analysis lacked recognition at the European supranational level. While it is true that 
the European Court had yet to show how similar or dissimilar its own version of proportionality was from the 
German version, the cause for such delay was the limited opportunities, as of that moment, for a robust application 
of proportionality. Furthermore, little if anything in IH suggested that the ECJ’s use of proportionality was 
manifestly different or generally incompatible with the method’s usage in German public law. The German 
constitutional judges’ views on how Luxembourg deployed the proportionality method cannot by itself explain the 
shift from Solange I to Solange II.  
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practice their trade and profession. The Nold holding goes beyond general statements about the 
importance of human rights in the European legal order, and addresses the sources of human 
rights. The Court held itself  “bound to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States” – thus refusing to uphold “measures which are incompatible 
with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those States.”85 This 
approach opens difficult methodological questions, involving the meaning of “common” 
traditions and the level of protection – floor or ceiling – that the European Court would adopt. 
Nold itself does not offer any definitive answers, and indeed for decades the Court would shy 
away from pursuing these questions with rigor. But merely raising these questions is no trivial 
matter for national judges, such as those called to decide Solange I, as they screened European 
law for evidence of adequate protection for human rights at the supranational level. Furthermore, 
Nold provided the first firm example of applied fundamental rights analysis with high ideological 
stakes. The European Court invoked the social functions of property as ground to limit its 
exercise, thus shifting the responsibility to the rights holder-plaintiffs to adapt to the economic 
implications of the new regulatory frameworks of coal production.  
Nold came down a full six months before the German Constitutional Court decided 
Solange I, in November 1974. Its analysis was available to the German Constitutional Court, just 
as the analysis – and holding – of some of the other cases was equally on display. Indeed, on that 
basis the dissenters in Solange I concluded that there was “enough case-law to permit the 
statement that fundamental rights are adequately protected at Community level.”86 Not so the 
                                                 
85 Case 4/73, Nold, 1974 E.C.R. 491.  
86 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 560 (dissenting opinion).   
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majority. While its shallow search cannot ignore these protections entirely87, it deemed them 
insufficient. To be sure, the protections were far from comprehensive, when compared to 
municipal human rights, or sufficiently watertight. But the shallow search did not construct a 
standpoint from which to gauge strengths and weaknesses of human rights protections by the 
supranational judiciary. Instead, it dismissed their potential outright. Its conclusion about the 
insufficiency of European protections for human rights was preordained by the conception of 
European constitutionalism in which the shallow method found its roots.   
 
IV. MANUFACTURING DISSENT  
   
Solange I’s influence, such as it was, turned out to be fleeting. The decision was met, 
both domestically and in Europe, with dismay and disparagement.88 It was never ground for dis-
applying European secondary legislation in Germany.89 Most significantly, as I discuss below, 
the German Constitutional Court eventually reversed its assessment of the European legal 
order.90 The real puzzle, looking retrospectively, is what explains Solange I’s reputation as an 
inflection point in European constitutionalism.  
Any answer has to start with the processes of ex-post meaning (re-) creation, in Solange 
II (1986). In that case, the German Constitutional Court unanimously found that “in conception, 
substance and manner of implementation” the protection of fundamental rights within the 
                                                 
87 Id. at X (referring to the protection of fundamental rights as “favorable”). 
88 See Hans Peter-Ipsen, BVerfG versus EuGH re ‘Grundrechte’., in 10 EUROPARECHT 1 (1975) (arguing that 
Solange I was “wrong…fallacious, superfluous, and legally-politically mistaken …[and] groundless.”).  
89 For a watering-down of the doctrine, see Vielleicht-Beschluss (“Maybe Decision”), 52 BVerfGE 187 (1979). 
90 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (“Solange II”), 73 BVerfGE 339 (1986), 2 BvR 197/83, Europäische Grundrechte-
Zeitschrift, 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 225 (1987).  
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“sovereign jurisdiction of the European communities” is “essentially comparable with the 
standards of fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution.”91 Underlying the description 
was a change in the normative tune. The German judges noted that “the legal orders of the 
member-States and that of the Community are not abruptly juxtaposed in a state of mutual 
insulation but are in numerous ways related to each other, interconnected and open to reciprocal 
effects.”92 Structural features of the European legal order stood out in that context. The very 
existence of the preliminary reference procedure, to take one prominent example, demonstrated 
to the German Court that, “in the interests of the Treaty objectives on integration, legal security 
and uniformity of application, it serves to bring about the most uniform possible interpretation 
and application of Community law in all courts within the sphere of application of the EEC 
Treaty.”93  
However, if one recalls that the preliminary reference procedure had been already in 
place before Solange I, and that little in its subsequent use was – or should have been – entirely 
surprising to the German judges, one realizes that the relevant question is not so much which 
overall features of the European legal order Karlsruhe found reassuring in Solange II but, rather, 
what were the new features or post-Solange I practices that stood out for the German judges. The 
answer is from self-evident. Little on the to-do list that the German Constitutional Court had 
presented to European institutions had been ticked off. Nothing akin to a bill of rights had been 
incorporated into the constitutive Treaties. There had been no significant change in the 
                                                 
91 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 259. 
92 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 251. As Justin Collins noted, much of the opinion reads as if 
it had been written by the dissenters in Solange I. See JUSTIN COLLINS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF 
THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1951-2001, 207 (2015).  
93 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 252.  
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Community’s institutional structure. One exception was the first holding of direct elections for 
the European Parliament in 1979, which, notably, did not require a Treaty amendment. But the 
elections were, and were widely perceived to be, insufficient to turn the European Parliament 
into an institution “to which the Community organs empowered to legislate are fully responsible 
on a political level.”94 At the political level, a joint declaration of the political institutions 
stressed the importance of protecting fundamental rights. While significant, that declaration 
chartered, at most, a political program lacking the hard legal effect that Solange I had called for. 
Finally, the European Court had continued to expand both the range of its fundamental rights 
jurisprudence as well as its relation to sources, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights.95 The German Constitutional Court took credit in Solange II for this development at the 
European level, although its self-serving congratulatory mood should be viewed with 
skepticism.96 In reality, the European Court’s jurisprudence had built on its own earlier cases 
such as IH and Nold, which had already been decided by the time Solange I was decided.97  
This all indicates that the explanation of the shift in Solange II had more – or, to be more 
exact, had everything – to do with the German Constitutional Court itself than with the European 
legal order. No longer committed to the shallow search for human rights that characterized 
                                                 
94 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X.  
95 Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727; Case 36/75 Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur, 1975 
E.C.R. 1219. See G. Federico Mancini, A Constitution for Europe, 26 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 611 (1989) (“[r]eading 
an unwritten bill of rights into Community law [as] indeed the most striking contribution that the Court has made to 
the development of a constitution for Europe.”). 
96 See also G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MODERN L. 
REV. 157, 187 (1994) (“It would be an exaggeration to say that the European Court was bulldozed into protecting 
fundamental rights by rebellious national courts.”). 
97 The German Constitutional Court did acknowledge the first openings of the European Court of Justice, “favorable 
though those have been to fundamental rights”, in Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 551.   
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Solange I, the German Court now looks deeper into the European legal order. Its rediscovery of 
the preliminary reference mechanism signals renewed propensity for structural “rule-of-law” 
analysis, and in particular for the role and status of the European Court of Justice within the 
larger Community structure.98 The German Court’s excursus on Treaty interpretation confirms 
the change of heart. The constitutional judges acknowledge that “gaps” might still exist in the 
European system of protecting fundamental rights, so long as it remains driven by case-law 
rather than the application of a bill of rights. But, in answering such concerns, what the Court 
found “decisive” was not the existence of the gaps themselves, but rather “the attitude of 
principle which the Court maintains at this stage towards the Community’s obligations in respect 
of fundamental rights … as is also the practical significance which has been achieved by the 
protection of fundamental rights in the meantime in the Court’s application of Community 
law.”99 Whatever the merits or demerits of such confidence, one can hardly imagine a farther cry 
from the imperative demand in Solange I that rights receive reliable protection through a “written 
bill of rights.”.  
The glaring question is how the German Constitutional Court, applying the standards it 
had articulated in Solange I, could rest content in Solange II with the protection of human rights 
at the EU level. The answer to that question is far from evident. The German Court pointed out, 
presumably for the purpose of reassuring its domestic audience, that Luxembourg did not commit 
itself to applying the “lowest common denominator” between the systems of human rights 
protections of the various national jurisdictions. But this creates an inescapable tension with the 
rights protections afforded under the German Basic Law. The Court’s direct answer is little more 
                                                 
98 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 251. 
99 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 262. 
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than an expression of hope: “it is to be expected that the European Court will strive to ensure the 
best possible development of any particular principle of fundamental rights in Community 
law.”100 The doctrinal influence of the European Convention on Human Rights on EU 
constitutionalism is deemed sufficient to guarantee the “minimum standard of substantive 
protection of fundamental rights which in principle satisfies the legal requirements of the 
Constitution as such.”101 But this only deepens the conundrum. If minimum standards of 
protection at the European level meet the needs of the German constitution, it must be that 
Solange I had deemed the European system incapable of protecting such minimum standards. 
And yet, if the European legal order is so fundamentally deficient, lacking in a necessary features 
of a specifically constitutionalist legal order, how could German law stand alongside it, 
recognizing its autonomy and functional interdependence?  
It must be, then, that an alternative interpretation in warranted. The German Court’s 
concern in Solange I is not with whether the European legal order can meet minimal standards, 
but rather with the compatibility or non-compatibility of the standards the European Court stood 
ready to recognize with the comparatively high level of human rights protections guaranteed 
under the German Basic Law.102 This is certainly a more cogent interpretation of Solange I. It 
was precisely that perceived unsustainability of demanding European law to meet the standards 
of one – and, eo ipso, presumably any -- of its municipal constitutional orders, that was deemed 
unacceptable both by the European court and, notably, by the dissenting German constitutional 
court judges. Yet, there is nothing reassuring about this alternative interpretation. If true, it only 
reinforces how puzzling, or misleading, Solange II’s mention of minimal standards remains.  
                                                 
100 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X.  
101 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 264. 
102 See also Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X (dissenting opinion).   
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There is still another way to handle the challenge of fitting Solange II into the standard 
the German Court had set in Solange I.  That solution is to abandon the lens of Solange I 
altogether and to conclude that Solange II essentially gave up on the standards they had 
themselves imposed over a decade previously.103 This approach has twofold implications. First, 
it accepts that the jurisprudential shifts between Solange I and II are rooted in developments at 
the national level. Whether these shifts represent sweeping changes or, as I have suggested, 
result from specifying previously under-theorized constitutional theories, these shifts are 
detached from the process of European integration that, in aspects that are relevant, cannot 
causally explain municipal constitutional developments. Second, this interpretation implicitly 
acknowledges the inadequacy of fundamental rights as ground for opposing the radical project of 
European integration qua unification. Relevant here is not only that the municipal constitutional 
doctrine develops in time, but rather the specific direction its development takes place from 
Solange I to Solange II. An important question arises in that context, about just how far the 
German Court goes in Solange II in the direction that the ECJ had previously laid out. Do the 
national constitutional judges go all the way to the transformative project of European 
integration as unification? After its acceptance in Solange I of the doctrine of autonomy, in the 
version originally formulated by the ECJ, did the German Court complete the normative 
alignment in Solange II by accepting the doctrine of supremacy, also in the version formulated 
by the ECJ?   
                                                 
103 Juliane Kokott notes that, whereas Solange I held that “basic rights” are part of the German constitutional Basic 
Law, Solange II identifies “legal principles” that underpin basic rights provision in the Basic Law are indispensable. 
See Juliane Kokott, Report on Germany, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS - DOCTRINE AND 
JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT, 90 (Slaughter, et al, eds., 1998). 
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The conventional interpretation of Solange II points out that the judgment does not 
surrender the German Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to review secondary European 
legislation. It only pledged that, so long as the European institutions “generally safeguard the 
essential content of fundamental rights” 104, German judges would no longer review the 
applicability of Community legislation within its jurisdiction.105 EU law has only precedence of 
application106, subject to the power of review that could presumably be activated at will upon a 
finding that the human rights safeguards at the European level are no longer in place. The sword 
of Damocles does its work while hanging in the air. That much is true. Still, it is still far from 
clear what are the implications of this residual power. The circumstances in which that power 
might be exercised are an important part of the context for understanding the power itself. How 
serious is a threat that comes from a sword that, despite opportunities aplenty107, has never fallen 
and which seems too heavy to hold in the air indefinitely? To be sure, the future is always open-
ended and Karlsruhe could conceivably use its residual power at some point in the future. But if 
it did it, its action would unsettle European constitutionalism so profoundly that, in all 
likelihood, it would usher in a paradigm shift away to a new, and different, constitutional 
settlement in the European Union.108 
                                                 
104 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X.  
105 Conversely, and in keeping with the logic of “applicability”, the German Court will decide which norms of 
German law will not be applicable in specific cases, even though they remain valid. See Kloppenburg, 75 BVerfGE 
223 (1987).   
106 See also Lisbon judgment, 123 BVerfGE 267, para. 240 (2009). 
107 For a recent and much publicized such opportunity, see Honeywell, 2 BvR 2661/06 (July. 6, 2010). 
108 Subsequent case law seems to confirm this interpretation. See the Banana Market decisions, 102 BVerfGE 147 
(2000), holding that actions against a EU legislative act were not admissible if it did not demonstrate that the 
standard of fundamental rights protection had slipped below a certain threshold. See also European Arrest Warrant, 
113 BVerfGE 273 (2005). 
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More intriguing is another attempt to show that Solange II does not bring German 
constitutional law in closer alignment with the tenets of European constitutionalism. In this view, 
the common reading Solange II as integration-friendly is mistaken. In fact, the German court 
undermines European integration by resting its holding on “the international law basis of the 
Community.”109 This interpretation is supported, first, by the German Court’s failure to 
recommit explicitly to the autonomy of the European legal order and, second, by its invocation 
of Article 24 of the German Basic Law.110 The first leg of the claim is unconvincing. 
Recognition of autonomy is implicit in the recognition of supremacy. From an internal 
perspective, the normative basis of European constitutionalism is unitary, and it incorporates 
both supremacy and autonomy, as the European Court never tired to point out. Furthermore, 
since the German Court had already settled that matter in Solange I, an explicit mention would 
have been necessary as that earlier jurisprudence was not being revisited. Thirdly, what I referred 
to above as the German Court’s change of normative tune in Solange II, together with references 
to specific references throughout the decision, suggests continuing acquiescence to the 
autonomy. Finally, it helps to recall that Solange II was a unanimous judgment. It is possible 
that, for prudential reasons, the Court either did not want, or could not find the appropriate 
language, to dwell on jurisprudential aspects of the autonomy of EU law without challenging its 
unity.  
It is equally unconvincing to interpret the German Court’s reliance on Article 24 as 
evidence of an integration-unfriendly decision. That provision was the general, and the only 
                                                 
109 Kokott, supra note 103, at 90 (Report on Germany). 
110 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] ART. 24 [1] The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to 
international organizations.  
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available pre-the 1992 constitutional amendment111, textual hook for “opening up” the German 
legal system to a legal universe beyond itself. The German Court relied on Article 24 to point out 
that inter-jurisdictional coupling by itself does not answer the problem of the priority of validity 
and application, that is, that priority rules “do not follow directly from general international 
law.”112 Such rules might follow from norms of domestic constitutionalism, but that is a matter 
of municipal law, and thus domestic self-government, rather than a response to a demand of 
international origin, based either on treaty or on custom.113 Importantly, the German Basic Law 
allows for “appropriate internal application-of-law instructions” with regard to specific transfers 
of sovereignty.114 And that was exactly the case with Germany’s participation in the European 
Economic Community.  
Now, using Article 24 of the Basic Law, and an Act by which the Bundestag ratified the 
Rome Treaty, as the basis for accepting the supremacy of EU law is, formally speaking, not the 
same as accepting that supremacy on the basis of the European Court’s Costa jurisprudence. But 
how surprising can it be that national constitutional judges would ground the most foundational 
decisions regarding centers of decision-making in their own constitution? National judges come 
to the encounter with European constitutionalism by their own systems’ trajectory – one marked 
by specific history, circumstance, and culture. They do not occupy a constitutional point of view 
                                                 
111 See id., ART. 23.  
112 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X.  
113 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 257 (“Current international law does not contain any 
general rule arising out of the agreed practice of States or undoubted legal acceptance to the effect that States are 
obliged to incorporate their treaties into their internal law and to accord them thereunder priority of validity or 
application as against internal law.”).   
114 On the question of the difference between transfer, conferral and limitation of sovereignty, see JO ERIC KHUSHAL 
MURKENS, FROM EMPIRE TO UNION: CONCEPTIONS OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SINCE 1871 158-59 (2013).  
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from nowhere. What makes it all the more significant is that, grounded as they are in the 
particulars of their national constitutions, they had to process the radical claims that European 
constitutionalism put forward. This state of affairs inevitably put put national apex courts in an 
unparalleled situation. Only a shallow – and partial115 – analysis, one that rests content with the 
perfunctory level of constitutional appearances, can read in the mere reference to Article 24 a 
denial of the autonomy of the European legal order in marked distinction from usual 
understandings of international law.  
The stakes of the internationalist interpretation of the holding and reasoning in Solange II 
become visible by enlarging the framework of reference to include not only what came before 
but also what came after it. The critical issue is how Solange II relates to the all-important 
Maastricht decision of the German Constitutional Court. If Solange II indeed denied the 
autonomy of the European legal order, then it was a precursor of Maastricht. And if Maastricht 
had such an immediate precursor, it would be wrong to portray that decision as the awakening of 
a dormant giant that, under the historical circumstances of the German reunification, it awakened 
ready to throw its weight at the process of European integration that had itself been recently 
resuscitated under the Single European Act [1986]. But if, by contrast, Maastricht does stand on 
the shoulders of Solange II, then it marks a sharp break with existing constitutional doctrine – 
and, through a mechanism that remains to be investigated, a critical juncture in the 
deradicalization of European legal integration. The crux of these questions is where Solange II 
stands in relation to the doctrine of autonomy, at what distance it is from Solange I. The answer, 
I have suggested, is to be found within inner workings of German constitutional law and politics. 
                                                 
115 While Solange II does not explicitly engage with the autonomy doctrine, it does mention that “by its entry into 
the EEC, [the German Republic] consent[ed] to the establishment of Community organs, and its collaboration in the 
foundation of an autonomous sovereign power.” Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at x.  
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But the inquiry cannot rest there, at least as far as European constitutionalism is concerned. From 
the perspective of European integration, the question is how the municipal German doctrinal 
twists have come to shape the doctrine of European supremacy and autonomy. By virtue of what 
doctrinal feature, or normative artifice, have they managed to colonize the internal point of view 
of European constitutionalism? When and how have the Europeans become the children of 
Solange and Maastricht?  
 
V. THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 
 
It is not possible to give a full answer to these questions in the remainder of this chapter. 
What I can do is to challenge a common assumption that the use of human rights in the pre-
Maastricht era somehow predetermined the future trajectory of European constitutionalism, up to 
and including the contemporary turn to constitutional identity. A more defensible interpretation 
of the evidence, in my view, is that human rights have been used, misused, half-discarded and 
eventually repackaged alongside new doctrines, such as self-government and identity, as part of 
the political strategy of constitutional resistance to what I referred previously as the 
preservationist project. That strategy of resistance to European unification, forged from German 
material, has shown its ugly face in recent years as the Union’s Eastern lands, especially 
Hungary and Poland, have appropriated the language of constitutional identity just as they sank 
ever deeper into authoritarianism. None of this should be surprising. Or, rather, it should not be 
surprising if the strategic misuse of human rights doctrines, including ex-post re-interpretations 
of Solange and their progenies, are seen for what they are, namely an important part of the 
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deradicalization of European integration that, under the pressure of the historical circumstances 
of the early twenty-first century, has led the Union to its current predicament.  
Temporality, let us recall, pervades the Solange judgments. It qualifies the holdings and 
opens up conceptual spaces, in a manner that, at least on its face, points away from constitutional 
determinism.  Solange I sets out to elucidate “the sui generis community in the process of 
progressive integration.”116 It depicts the relationship between the municipal and European legal 
orders as in flux. The judges write about the “present state of integration” in which the 
Community “still lacks a democratically legitimate parliament.”117 The legal difficulty of having 
to sort out the ranking of legal orders is a “legal difficulty arising exclusively from the 
Community's continuing integration process, which is still in flux and which will end with the 
present transitional phase.”118 Temporality is also Solange II’s saving grace. “The present stage” 
of Community integration is found to be different from the previous stages, differences that the 
German Court registers as satisfactory progress.119  
This sense of unfolding and development underpins the open-statehood position of 
German law in relation to European integration. Time is an essential, if ambiguous, dimension of 
constitutional openness. Much changes in time, but there are also elements that the passing of 
time leaves unaffected. “Open statehood”, as one scholar aptly captured the German position vis-
à-vis European integration, “does not mean open-ended statehood.”120 Time changes the 
perspective on how municipal orders relate to European legal orders, yet not all aspects of that 
                                                 
116 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 549.  
117 Id. (emphasis added).  
118 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at X (emphasis added).  
119 Solange II, supra note 90, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 265. 
120 MURKENS, supra note 114, at 160.  
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interplay are subject to development or reconsideration over time. The German Court’s emphasis 
of the limits of conferral of sovereignty from the national to the European levels identifies lines 
that must not be crossed. In Solange I, the Court states that “Article 24 (1) of the Constitution 
does not open the way to ‘altering the basic structure of the constitution, on which its identity 
rest.”121 Solange II elaborates: “Article 24 (1) does not confer a power to surrender by way of 
ceding sovereign rights to international institutions the identity of the prevailing constitutional 
order … by breaking into its basic framework.”122 The tone of authority cannot shun the 
ambiguities of the relation between time and identity. Constitutional identity develops in time; 
the passing of time changes identity. But identity is also that which cannot change (merely) 
through the passing of time. Fundamental rights represent an aspect of the German constitutional 
identity that cannot – and, as the German sovereign thunders – will not, be surrendered to the 
supranational level.123  
There are two shifts underway here. The first, which is subtle, concerns a center of 
gravity moving from human rights to identity. In the early Solange judgments, identity appears 
as the normative, if under-theorized, background of human rights. Over time, it will expand to 
encompass human rights as a subset of a constitutional identity. I return to this process below.  
What made the first shift difficult to grasp, until recently and in retrospect, was that it 
unfolded against the background of another, far more virulent movement. The movement was a 
tectonic shift in the constitutional tactics of reinforcing the autonomy of national jurisdictions as 
a strategy of fragmenting European law. Solange’s lesson, in this light, is that half-measures will 
not succeed against the project of European unification. To be effective, that is, to hold the 
                                                 
121 Solange I, supra note 21, COMMON MKT. L. REV. at x.  
122 Id. at 257.  
123 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] ART. 79(3).  
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national line against supranational construction, constitutional resistance to unification must be 
as radical as the vision it opposes. Solange I’s flaw was to have accepted the claim to autonomy 
of the European legal order. Radical opposition to the project of European integration required 
the rejection of that claim in no uncertain terms. So the next time the German Constitutional 
Court came swinging against European unification, in the Maastricht decision, the German 
judges rejected the claim to autonomy of the European legal order and European 
constitutionalism wholesale. Furthermore, rather than spending its energy solely on the doctrine 
of supremacy, as the German Court had done in Solange I, Maastricht made a doctrinal move 
much harder to revert: it linked identity with self-government.  
As far as autonomy is concerned, Maastricht theorizes explicitly and unabashedly the 
European legal order as a subset of the international legal order: “The Maastricht Treaty 
constitutes an agreement under international law establishing a compound of States of the 
Member States which is oriented towards further development. The inter-governmental 
community is dependent upon the Treaty continually being constantly revitalized by the Member 
States; the fulfillment and development of the Treaty must ensue from the will of the contracting 
parties.”124 The Treaty of Maastricht is thus seen as establishing a community of States, whose 
identity is respected and autonomy guaranteed, as is the case in any international organization – 
“and not with membership in a single European State.”125 The conclusion, replete with 
international lingo is, is that “Germany is therefore maintaining its status as a sovereign State in 
                                                 
124 Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Oct. 12, 1993) (German Constitutional Court Decision); Brunner v. European 
Union Treaty, COMM. MKT. L. REV. (1994). As one scholar put it, the reduction of supranational commitments to the 
aims of international law was “a slap in the face of [Walter Hallstein’s] idea of legal community.” MURKENS, supra 
note 114, at 192 (Citing Pernice, at 706 (2004)). 
125 Maastricht Judgment, at 16.  
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its own right as well as the status of sovereign equality with other States in the sense of Art. 2, 
sub-para 1 of the UN Charter of 26 June, 1945.”126 At the time of German reunification, as the 
Constitutional Court took it upon itself the task of replenishing the normative resources of the 
German state, German constitutionalism demands that states be and remain the main actors of 
European integration.127 
In this brave (old) world, human rights are both insufficiently effective as the central 
medium for national resistance to European unification as well as too important a category to 
dismiss them outright. The task, then, is to repackage them. The starting point of the repackaging 
strategy is the depiction in both Solange I and II of human rights as an element of constitutional 
identity. Interestingly, however, self-government itself is part of the identity package, following 
Maastricht’s depiction of a community that promises to itself to preserve a space for politics 
where decisions affecting the life of each member will be made collectively. What, one might 
wonder, of the inherent normative tension between human rights, on the one hand, and 
democracy, on the other? If national constitutional identity is to be coherent, its component 
elements, including human rights and the commitment to self-government, must be made 
                                                 
126 Maastricht Judgment, at 21. The court would continue along the same lines in its Lisbon judgment. Christian 
Calliess calls is “almost tragic” that, in adopting an international law perspective, “the court is adopting a restrictive 
democratic approach towards the very organization which – contrary to classic institutional organizations like the 
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making and control powers.” Christian Calliess, The Future of the Eurozone and the Role of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, 31 YEARBOOK OF EU LAW 402, 406 (2012).  
127 MURKENS, supra note 114, at 154 (arguing that the court’s use of meta-concepts such as identity, statehood or 
sovereignty can be explained as a show of force vis-à-vis the ECJ, cause by the failure to reconceptualize public law, 
especially the constitutional relation with the European Union.”). 
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coherent.128 This is not only a normative challenge but also, given the judgments of the German 
Constitutional Court, a doctrinal problem.   
Doctrinally, one might expect a Solange III that sorts out the effect of democratic self-
government on human rights, through the lens of constitutional identity. It is thus perhaps 
unsurprising that the Solange III label has been applied, among others, to the Maastricht129 and 
Lisbon decisions130 as well as cases in the European Arrest Warrant saga.131 So much has been 
included under that rubric that perhaps Solange III is best understood not so much as a case in 
waiting132, but rather as the name of an entire age of German, and indeed European, 
constitutionalism. This is an age that combines identity, human rights and democracy to protect 
itself from perceived supranational encroachment. Some combinations are benign.133 Others, 
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IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 109 (2013).  
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such as those in Hungary, are less so.134 Either way, these doctrinal solutions will often require 
innovation. Inalienable dignity, for instance, is expanded beyond the ambit of the right expressly 
recognized in Article 1 of the Basic Law, and to a dignity “core” of other fundamental rights.135 
The familiar and reassuring principle of mutual trust, which has been a pillar of European 
constitutionalism, becomes subject to the condition of satisfying municipal constitutional 
guarantee of dignity in situations such as intra-Union extraditions.136 
A question remains, at the normative level, how human rights dovetail within an 
identitarian, democratic paradigm. Joseph Weiler account of rights as “fundamental boundaries” 
provides an influential answer.137 The account is couched as a metaphysical gloss meant as 
“guarantee against existential loneliness”138, but at its core, it uses fundamental boundaries is a 
“metaphor for the principle of enumerated powers and limited competences that are designed to 
                                                 
134 See the Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB (available online at 
http://hunconcourt.hu/letoltesek/en_22_2016.pdf) (citing the Solange cases in creating a municipal doctrine of 
fundamental rights review and an ultra vires review, the latter consisting of a sovereignty review and an identity 
review). In particular, the Hungarian Constitutional Court held, regarding fundamental rights review, that “any 
exercise of public authority in the territory of Hungary (including the joint exercising of competences with other 
Member States) is linked to fundamental right.” After referring to the Solange decisions of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Hungarian judges found that the Court “cannot set aside the ultima ratio protection of 
human dignity and the essential content of fundamental rights, and it must [ensure that the EU law] not result in 
violating human dignity or the essential content of fundamental rights.”. Id, at para. 49. Under Article E (2) of the 
Hungarian Constitution, “the joint exercising of a competence shall not violate Hungary’s sovereignty (sovereignty 
control), and on the other hand it shall not lead to the violation of constitutional identity (identity control).”. Id, at 
para. 54. For an early analysis, see Gábor Halmai, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity, 
VerfBlog, 2017/1/10, http://verfassungsblog.de/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-and-constitutional-identity/. 
135 OMT judgment, BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2728/12], para. 138 (Jun. 21, 2016). 
136 BVerfGE, 2 BvR2735/14, para 83 (Dec. 15, 2015). For the ECJ’s answer, see Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 
PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăreanu (Apr. 5, 2016).  
137 JOSEPH H.H WEILER, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 
(1999). 
138 Id. at 104.   
 42 
guarantee that in certain areas communities (rather than individuals) should be free to make their 
own social choices without interference from above.”139 The EU is the “above”, the threat to 
aspects of identity through which communities distinguish themselves from others and, 
generally, from the outside world. Rights are, in Weiler’s account, “both a source of, and an 
index for, cross-national differentiation and not only cross-national assimilation.”140 They 
represent core values that are part of self-understanding – a community’s “particularized identity 
rooted in history and political culture.”141 Rights are inherently fragile since they are the 
outcome of clashes of deeply felt values and normative projects at the national level. Since 
“human rights are almost inevitably the expression of a compromise between competing social 
goods in the polity,”142 the process of European integration should tread carefully not to interfere 
with those constitutional accomplishments that everyone with passing knowledge of modern 
history knows to be distressingly fragile.  
  Those constitutional accomplishments, and especially the processes by which they are 
come about, now fall under the protective shell of constitutional identity. Consider how they are 
integrated into a system of supranational protection. One indispensable doctrine concerns the 
standard for human rights protections. A possible approach is to hold that, beyond a common 
threshold that receives European protection,  each political community ought to be free to define 
rights in ways that reflect its own fundamental values.143 These processes of rights articulations 
are constitutive of political identity. Rooted as they are in history, political and social culture, 
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they are an acknowledgment of the “social nature of mankind.”144 Constitutional litigation will 
center on what elements of specific rights fall under and above the threshold. But as long as the 
normative medium is that of identity and democracy, the interplay between the supranational and 
municipal, as far as rights definition, interpretation and application is concerned, will likely be 
structural rather than substantive.145 This too is a form of coordination which extends to the 
definition of rights, which is just another form of the interaction among political communities 
that find themselves enmeshed in a process of complex coordination. But this type of 
coordination, like all other types, does not threaten the separateness and deference to the 




 The recent crises that have befallen the European Union, from the Eurozone crisis to the 
incoming refugees and from Brexit to the rule-of-law erosion in the East, have renewed the call 
for deeper political integration within the Union. The resurrection of plans for a common defense 
union, the proposals for a Eurozone parliament and a full-blown banking union are all part of 
what might develop into a new age of European integration. It is, at this stage, impossible to 
predict Europe’s contours during such an age, in part because of the nature of political life both 
nationally and supranationally and in part because of larger tectonic shifts that are 
simultaneously occurring on the global political and economic scenes. Nevertheless, it is 
certainly not too early to debate the constitutional foundations of a new age of integration. This 
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chapter, while primarily a study of the history of human rights, can be read as an argument that at 
least some of the constitutional bases for deeper integration, and indeed perhaps even European 
unity, are already present in the foundational doctrines of European constitutionalism. If and 
when the Union moves into this next phase, its constitutional doctrines would not need to be 
reinvented wholesale, though some of the meaning they have lost post-Maastricht would have to 
be recovered through reinterpretation.  
 This chapter has sketched out what that task of reinterpretation might involve. I have 
challenged the widely held view that human rights were absent from the genesis of the EU legal 
order. I have argued instead that, by deploying methods that have become routine in domestic 
constitutionalism, one could gain a better understanding of the decisions of the European Court 
of Justice that found human rights as part of the European legal order from the moment when 
that order became constitutionalized. As far as the normative stakes of this debate are concerned, 
I have challenged the neutrality of the prevailing account, which offers in my view questionable 
doctrinal support for the equally questionable normative view that, since the viability of 
European constitutionalism depends on access to the normative resources of the national legal 
orders, such as in the case of human rights doctrines, European law’s strong claim to autonomy 
from domestic law is inevitably compromised. In fact, I argued, there has never been anything 
neutral about the use of human rights at the normative interface between municipal and European 
law. Human rights, just like constitutional identity or the argument from democracy itself, can be 
made to look neutral if they are misrepresented as by themselves setting the terms of that 
interplay between national and supranational law. They are naturalized by their acceptance as 
discourses of legitimation. Scholarly reflection on European constitutionalism should challenge 
that naturalization, not rationalize it. Given the current state of the European Union, it is likely 
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that the future of European integration might well depend on how successful that challenge will 
be.  
*** 
 
 
 
 
